files or directories when applicable.
The inspiration and name of MACHINE_CPU come from NetBSD, although the way to
provide it to Makefiles is completely different.
ok kettenis@
doesn't test it, so factor out the two places that test it into a
routine and do the refreshing there. With this, arch4random_buf()
doesn't trigger superfluous calls to getpid() when filling large
buffers.
ok deraadt@, "looks nicer indeed" otto@
macros for them. Avoids walking the lists and greatly enhances speed
of freeing chunks in reverse or random order at the cost of a little
space. Suggested by Fabien Romano and Jonathan Armani; ok djm@
unmaintainable). these days, people use source. these id's do not provide
any benefit, and do hurt the small install media
(the 33,000 line diff is essentially mechanical)
ok with the idea millert, ok dms
ecvt, fcvt, gcvt, *printf, strtof, strtod, strtold act per ieee
1003.1. after these massive changes, remove unused files which
would not work now. reported by Maksymilian Arciemowicz; ok theo
standard explicitly disallows passing setenv a name with a '=' in
it but historic BSD behavior is to allow this but to ignore the '='
and anything after it.
on sparc, it expands to something that just plain does not work,
because the page size can be variable. Sorry we didn't spot this
before. Backing it all out to allow sparc to build; please find a
different way to fix it.
Move all runtime options into a structure that is made read-only
(via mprotect) after initialisation to protect against attacks that
overwrite options to turn off malloc protections (e.g. use-after-free)
Allocate the main bookkeeping data (struct dir_info) using mmap(),
thereby giving it an unpredictable address. Place a PROT_NONE guard
page on either side to further frustrate attacks on it.
Add a new 'L' option that maps struct dir_info PROT_NONE except when
in the allocator code itself. Makes attacks on it basically impossible.
feedback tedu deraadt otto canacar
ok otto
jmc