server is wired up such that non MITM attacks are possible, and NTP
packets can be trusted. Therefore constraint validity is not required,
and during boot ntpd can spin-up correct time faster.
with otto, ok jmc schwarze
non-sensical. The dns lookups happened in the process routing table
(usually '0'), which is very likely to have different results from the
other routing domains. If you do depend on having this behaviour,
you'll need to use pf to cross the rtable boundary.
"listen on * rtable X" is still supported.
Users of "server * rtable X" will need to switch to launching ntpd with
"route -T X exec /usr/sbin/ntpd"
OK deraadt@
time from HTTPS servers, by parsing the Date: header, and use the
median constraint time as a boundary to verify NTP responses. This
adds some level of authentication and protection against MITM attacks
while preserving the accuracy of the NTP protocol; without relying on
authentication options for NTP that are basically unavailable at
present. This is an initial implementation and the semantics will be
improved once it is in the tree.
Discussed with deraadt@ and henning@
OK henning@
This basically adds the "rtable %d" keyword to "listen on", "server",
"servers" keywords, to specify which routing table to use.
OK henning@ claudio@ sthen@
manpage reviewed by jmc@
which only works in w.europe
- use a more realistic value for udcf correction example
- use a GPS-only receiver for "refid GPS" example
suggested/ok mbalmer