Send OPENSSL_issetugid() straight to hell, no final cigarette.

The issetugid() API is supposed to make a strong promise where "0
means it is safe to look at the environment".  Way back in the past
someone on the OpenSSL team responded to the environment access danger
by creating a wrapper called OPENSSL_issetugid, and went to use it a
number of places.  However, by default on systems lacking true
issetugid(), OPENSSL_issetugid returns 0.  0 indicating safely.  False
safety.  Which means OPENSSL_issetugid() fails to make any sort of
promise about safety, in fact it is just the opposite.
Can you believe the OpenSSL team?
This nastiness was noticed over the years, however noone could gain traction
and get it fixed in OpenSSL.  Also see a paragraph about this in
http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/worst-common-denominator-programming
ok jsing

src/lib/libcrypto/crypto/Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.56 2015/02/10 13:28:17 jsing Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.57 2015/04/11 16:16:15 deraadt Exp $
 
 LIB=	crypto
 
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ CFLAGS+= -I${LCRYPTO_SRC}/modes -I${LCRYPTO_SRC}/asn1 -I${LCRYPTO_SRC}/evp
 
 # crypto/
 SRCS+= cryptlib.c malloc-wrapper.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c cpt_err.c
-SRCS+= uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_init.c
+SRCS+= o_time.c o_str.c o_init.c
 SRCS+= mem_clr.c
 
 # aes/

src/lib/libcrypto/crypto/shlib_version

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-major=32
+major=33
 minor=0