existing RAND interfaces unchanged.
All interfaces allowing external feed or seed of the RNG (either from a file
or a local entropy gathering daemon) are kept for ABI compatibility, but are
no longer do anything.
While the OpenSSL PRNG was required 15+ years ago when many systems lacked
proper entropy collection, things have evolved and one can reasonably assume
it is better to use the kernel (system global) entropy pool rather than trying
to build one's own and having to compensate for thread scheduling...
<RANT>
Whoever thought that RAND_screen(), feeding the PRNG with the contents of the
local workstation's display, under Win32, was a smart idea, ought to be banned
from security programming.
</RANT>
ok beck@ deraadt@ tedu@
as configuration files; split manpages and .pc files between libcrypto and
libssl.
No functional change, only there to make engineering easier, and libcrypto
sources are still found in libssl/src/crypto at the moment.
ok reyk@, also discussed with deraadt@ beck@ and the usual crypto suspects.
of the stride. don't overwrite past the end of the buffer, and also save
that amount for later so the array is completely filled. ok deraadt djm
reported by Dmitry Chestnykh (dchest)
use better constant for salt size.
always copy ":" to gerror, in case somebody is dumb enough to overwrite it
timingsafe_bcmp before somebody whines about strcmp
and use it as the default location for the DNSSEC root key. Update default
config for this location.
With this, the only step required to enable DNSSEC validation is to
uncomment these default config entries and restart:
#module-config: "validator iterator"
#auto-trust-anchor-file: "/var/unbound/db/root.key"
There is no longer a requirement to run unbound-anchor manually to
update the root key. The rc.d script will take care of updates at boot,
and Unbound will manage the file itself at runtime.
Test with "dig test.dnssec-or-not.net txt @127.0.0.1" or similar.
beck